The proposed Gargill purchase of Continental Grain's grain merchandising business would join the world's two largest grain and oilseed exporters. Many farm organizations, other participants in the industry, regulators, and policy makers have expressed concerns about the proposed acquisition. We will describe the businesses and market volumes involved, the locations where potential losses of competition from their combination may be important or insignificant, and discuss potential increases in efficiency or effectiveness which might be expected from such a business combination. Ultimately, the questions regarding the acquisition are likely to boil down to comparing the potential benefits and costs, overall, and we will briefly consider both. What are the advantages of concerns raised regarding the Cargill acquisition of Continental Grain company's grain merchandising business? The largest grain exporter acquiring the second largest exporter has raised some concerns regarding potential loss of
In a relatively brief one-month study, a team of economists from several universities' interviewed a number of knowledgeable members of the grain merchandising and exporting industry in the United States. Questions were posed regarding possible areas of concern, and opinions regarding potential effects on competition in the grain merchandising industry. Industry participants were asked for estimated storage and loading capacities for their firms and leading competitors, and their estimates of merchandising volume or market shares owned or controlled by leading competitors. Several strategic locations important in the grain merchandising business were selected for more in-depth analysis due to their influence in the export or river terminal marketing systems, and the futures markets which play a very important role in price discovery and risk management in the grain merchandising industry.
Thus, we emphasize interior barge loading locations on the Illinois (the delivery location for the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) com and soybean futures markets beginning in 2000), Mississippi and Ohio rivers, futures market delivery locations currently at Chicago, Toledo, and Kansas City, and the high volume export locations on the East and West coasts. The information collected comes from a number of government, trade publication and industry sources. The data and analysis below has been reviewed by several economists and industry members. While we attempted to eliminate mistakes and omissions, there may be some remaining which were unable to be corrected in the short time frame available for the study.
Viewpoirits regarding concerns and potential implications were solicited from Cargill, Continental Grain, and other industry and government sources. Sources of data are camouflaged where necessary to preserve confidentiality. Throughout, we offer the pros and cons to consider on the issues raised by farmers, industry members, and government policy makers and regulators, hopefully in a non-judgmental way, to stimulate an informed dialog.
Antitrust review procedures
A major combination of two leading competitors in the U.S. and world grain merchandising industry certainly will prompt market power concerns by policy makers, the Secretary of Agricultare, etc., which will involve data submission to the relevant antitrust agencies. The review (and subsequent challenge or approval) will be done by the U.S. Department of Justice and similar agencies in other parts of the world where both companies extensively do business.
U.S. antitrust law bars transactions that are likely to have substantial anticompetitive effects (Azcuenaga). The unifying theme of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) merger guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise, [the full text of FTC/DOJ merger guidelines is available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm] Market power to a seller is the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time. The relevant agency (the food industry usually is the Department of Justice jurisdiction) assesses whether the merger would significantly increase concentration and result in a concentrated market, properly defined and measured. Second, the agency assesses whether the merger, in light of market concentration and other factors that characterize the market, raises concern about potential adverse competitive effects. Third, it analyzes whether entry by new competitors will be timely, likely, and sufficient either to deter or to counteract the likely short-term anti-competitive effects. Fourth, it assesses any efficiency gains that cannot reasonably be achieved by the parties through other means.
Typically, the focus of agency review in the U.S. will be determining: (1) the relevant market for analysis; (2) the share of the market controlled by the companies involved; (3) the measures of market concentration before and after the acquisition (small changes are usually considered more important in more highly concentrated markets; large changes are relatively less important in unconcentrated markets), and (4) the ease and speed of entry by potential competitors. In some cases, control of key technologies (e.g. Monsanto's genetic engineering patents in their recent DEKALB Genetics acquisition) or raw materials, or possible competitive bottlenecks or foreclosure of access to markets at important stages in a distribution chain may suggest potential market power. Such conditions may warrant further analysis.
At the same time, tradeoffs to possible reductions in market competition are also considered. The Agency considers whether efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential, to harm consumers or suppliers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases to customers or price reductions to suppliers in that market. The Merger Guidelines indicate that merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency can verify by reasonable means: (1) the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency; (2) how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so); (3) how each would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete; and (4) why each would be merger-specific. Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative or otherwise cannotbe verifiedby reasonable means.
Two key points are raised in the Guidelines regarding efficiencies as an offset to concerns regarding loss of competition-(a) efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great; and (b) efficiencies almost neverjustify a merger to form a monopoly or nearmonopoly.
The industry and market setting
To put the proposed acquisition in perspective, we first review the changing structure of the world and U.S. markets in which these grain merchandisers operate."
The food and agricultural sector has been undergoing rapid consolidation in the last two decades, as this sector joined with many others in the U.S. economy in the merger and acquisition wave. The farm production transition toward fewer, larger, more sophisticated operations was joined by similar consolidation of volumes in the hands of fewer, larger firms in the farm input, food processing, food wholesaling, food service and food retailing industries. The international scope of the market for food and agricultural products expanded dramatically, and the demands of the domestic and international customers changed the nature of competition and the strategies necessary to succeed in these inter-related industries. Developments in information technology and, more recently, biotechnology have begun to play major roles in the organization of the food sector.
U.S. grain exports have been cyclical, and,often volatile from year to year (See Figure 1) . In the late 1960s and 70s, the world grain market grew rapidly as incomes improved globally, and markets which previously had been closed (especially the former Soviet Union) became major customers for grain. This often involved single government buyers of basic commodities in very large bulk transactions. U.S. grain production and exports grew rapidly, as did the corresponding infrastructure to provide the necessary storage, rail, barge, and ocean freight distribution system. (See Figure 1) . In the 1980s and 1990s, the export market tumbled as the economies of, first, the former Soviet Union, and later the increasingly important Asian customers (Japan, Thailand, Korea, etc.) had significant problems which led to a sharp reduction in overall grain and oilseed exports. Argentina and Brazil became major competitors in com and soybean export markets, and Western Europe became a net exporter in the late 1980s, reducing the U.S. share of world exports.
At the same time, the growth of the U.S. poultry and livestock feeding sector and the domestic grain and oilseed processing industries (com sweeteners, ethanol, soy crushing) led to greater domestic use of grain and soybeans, and a reduced role for exports in the U.S. marketing system. Expanded pork and beef exports displaced grain exports. Grain and oilseed export-related facilities for storage, handling, transporting, and ship-loading were built as a result of government program incentives or contemplation of continued export growth, resulting in substantial excess capacity (grain storage capacity peaked in the late 1980s). While excess capacity is difficult to measure with precision, comparing peak export volumes in recent years, months or quarters with recent export volumes (see Table 1 ) shows a few measures of surplus capacity in the U.S. grain export system, and why recent profitability suffered for the major grain merchandisers most dependent on exports. Note that the export areas in Table 1 may not be defined the same as the tables which follow (e.g. Pacific includes Califomia as well as Pacific Northwest ports; Interior are basically Mexican and Canadian border terminal sources, primarily rail). Note also that with the extreme volatility of U.S. grain exports in relatively short periods of time, that substantial excess capacity is needed to accommodate unanticipated surges in demand. In two out of the last seven years, these export surges caused volume changes of 55% from the high to the low export volumes. Moreover, grain export demand is seasonal so that annual export volumes may under-state peak capacity needs during the fall harvest season.
Trying to describe effectively the many stages of the grain and oilseed marketing system is very difficult. Grain sold by a fariner to a local elevator and ultimately destined for export may have several changes of ownership, with prices established several times at different locations, at rail terminals, river terminals, and export terminals, (See Figure 2) . Grain may be diverted from that distribution stream by competitive bidding from livestock producers, feed companies, com or soybean processors along the way. A fairly large number of competing merchandisers may own relatively few facilities like country grain elevators, barge or ship loading facilities, but still be active competitors (paper traders) buying and selling grain at each stage of the merchandising system, and using facilities owned by others (acquired on a competitive bid basis) for storing, blending, loading and unloading. With excess capacity in the storage and distribution system in recent years, their operating costs are often quite low, and "paper traders" have been effective competitors. Their effectiveness, however, is heavily dependent on excess capacity in the marketing system, and with concentrated ownership of facilities, they would be much less effective if exports were to increase sharply and strain the capacity of the system at a future time.
The players in the grain merchandising system have changed greatly over the last 20 years. Price discovery takes place at each stage of the system where ownership changes hands, with the interaction of supply and demand forces in each local or regional area, in turn influenced by supply and demand conditions at locations closer to the ultimate customer for the basic commodities-the domestic or export customer. Price reporting by government agencies plus the interactions of buyers and sellers provide a good deal of transparency in the price discovery process among the merchandisers, and-through government price reporting and bids to local elevators-ultimately to farmers.
I
The Chicago and Kansas City Boards of Trade and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange play a significant role in providing com, wheat and soybean futures contracts which are used to manage price risks for farmers and grain merchandisers at all stages of the system. All three futures markets have delivery points for each contract which involve some Cargill and Continental elevators. The futures markets are a major source of market information as well as global price-discovery mechanisms, and exert significant influence on the price and margin structure in the grain industry. Industry speculation is that Continental excelled in very large volume bulk export trading, and had not diversified enough into the value added processing to compete effectively in a market environment where export volumes have been sharply reduced in recent years.
To compete effectively by restructuring their operations at this late date would require too much capital and too much risk. Continental's storage capacity declined significantly over the last 10 years, while Cargill, ADM and Peavey expanded (Top Producer, Jan., 1999) . Their capital could be more productively employed in their other agricultural and financial businesses.
Why did Cargill buy Continental?
Cargill expects this acquisition to contribute to its ability to compete effectively in a rapidly changing market environment. The acquisition will contribute to more effective knowledge acquisition and transfer from an expanded global presence and a broader base of grain origination facilities in the countries where grain is produced. The grain merchandising system is a high fixed cost system. Cargill hopes to compete more effectively and keep a large share of the Continental volume, capturing economies of scale by running more volume through without equivalent changes in the costs of managing their system. Further, Cargill expects that it will be more able to take costs out of the system, not just through fewer people, but by dedicating some facilities to specialized products and getting more efficiencies in operations (shorter barge turnaround times, longer runs in elevator handling, etc.). Their new joint venture with Monsanto to arrange production and to market value-added specialty grains and oilseeds for the feed and processing industries will require greater capacity to handle segregated grain flows throughout the domestic and export marketing system. Continental has had a significant presence in the identity preserved grain market, with half its international feed customers converted to high oil com. Cargill expects to better serve the producer by enhancing productivity and passing some of those cost savings on in the form of better prices to their suppliers and customers. They also plan offer many more price risk management alternatives and advice, financing, etc., to farmers.
The efficiencies which Cargill plans to achieve from the acquisition will have to be estimated in tangible terms for consideration by the Department of Justice. In addition, some of the less tangible benefits identified by Cargill could influence the firm's effectiveness in competing in the domestic and world market arenas. A broader coverage of the major world suppliers and customers in the world grain and oilseed trade may offer improved market intelligence, a key to effective trading in a very risky environment, as well as more effective and timely sourcing to serve a broader array of discriminating customers.
Concerns regarding the acquisition
The basic concern expressed by some farmers, politicians, and industry participants is that Cargill bought Continental to remove a significant competitor, particularly in the export market, and expand merchandising margins. The ability to "control" more facilities and larger volumes of grain and soybeans might adversely influence competition and the transparency^d effectiveness of the price discovery process in the grain marketing system.
Other issues which might arise are similar to those being raised in the current Microsoft This paper will deal with only a few of the most important issues, but hopefully will lay the groundwork for subsequent study of other issues.
Some relevant facts
How much will the acquisition change the number and size of competitors in the U.S. grain marketing system? We examine the Cargill and Continental grain elevator storage capacity, barge and ship loading capability, and volumes handled at each stage of the system by Cargill, Continental, and their major competitors. Further, we consider other factors influencing whether the acquisition of Continental might change the competitive landscape significantly. The overall influence of Cargill and Continental and their overlaps in the U.S. can be seen in the U.S. map ( Figure 2 ) summarizing all country, river and ship loading elevator locations in the U.S. developed from the April, 1998 USDA Farm Services Agency data base on off-farm grain storage capacity. The second map (Figure 3) shows the locations of the key barge and ship loading areas which we subjected to further study, due to their potential to be a competitive bottleneck if there were very high levels of concentration at these locations.
Cargill indicates that the combined grain merchandising businesses accounted for 3 percent of the 10,500 U.S. commercial grain storage facilities (6-7 percent of commercial storage space), 20 percent of river terminal elevator capacity, 35 percent of U.S. grain and oilseed exports, and 10-13 percent of grain coming off farms (8-10 percent-Cargill, 1-2 percent-Continental Grain). In the Louisiana and Texas Gulf, Continental only had a small share of capacity (9 and 12 percent, respectively) in each location. Combined with Cargill's 22 percent share in the Texas Gulf and near 30 percent in the larger-volume Louisiana Gulf ports, this may not be viewed as a significant change from the acquisition, since there are several competitive private and public (e.g. Port of Houston, Port of Corpus Christi) ship loading terminals. In the combined Louisiana and Texas Gulf port area, Cargill accounts for 36 percent of ship loading storage capacity after the acquisition, versus 26 percent before. While the advantages of low cost barge transportation may make the Louisiana Gulf ports more attractive destinations for export grain from many parts of the upper Midwest than the Texas gulf, the Gulf ports also are competitive with each other and probably with East Coast and Great Lakes ports for export business in many countries. The Gulf ports often will also be competing.directly or indirectly for some parts of the west central U.S. grain with exporters using the PNW ports to serve Asian markets as well. Thus, the shares by leading firms in a local or regional area may not be a good indicator of their potential impact on competition and prices in those areas.
Since the export market concentration is substantially higher than at other stages in the grain marketing system, this is one of the relevant market issues which will have to be carefully examined by the antitrust authorities. Are any or all of these ports really separate and distinct markets? If so, is the change in export market concentration (shares of market volume, not capacity) attributable to the acquisition likely to significantly reduce competition?
River barge terminal locations
We have examined USDA data on storage capacity and barge loading capability for facilities located on the Illinois (both the upper part North of Pekin and entire river), Ohio, Upper Mississippi, and Missouri (near Kansas City) Rivers. These are the barge feeder systems into the Mississippi River for export out of the Gulf. Approved facilities in the Kansas locations serve as the delivery points for the Kansas City Board of trade wheat contract, and the Northern Illinois River is slated to be the com futures delivery area for the Chicago Board of Trade in 2000, while the entire Illinois River (down to St. Louis) will serve as the delivery points for the CBOT soybean futures contracts. The USDA data are summarized in Tables 14-19 . Be cautious in interpreting the barge loading capacity, as it appears that some facilities with shared capacity are listed multiple times in the USDA data.
We note little change from the Cargill acquisition on the Missouri River, and the Ohio River. We also examined the Columbia River, Arkansas River and Tennessee River (no tables included), and found little or no change from the acquisition. Consequently, we will not consider them further.
On the Upper Mississippi, where there are a large number of competing firms, Cargill's addition of Continental modestly increases its share of storage capacity to near 27 percent, from 20 percent previously.
On the Illinois River, the shares by company vary depending upon whether all the river (for the CBOT soybean contract) or the Northern part of the river (for the CBOT com contract) are considered, and whether the very large Chicago Continental facility and the Cargill Bums Harbor facility are included as river barge loading locations. The Chicago facilities are higher cost operations; thus they rarely load barges.
We will discuss the shares of capacity excluding the Chicago area facilities, then footnote differences when they are included. ADM is clearly the largest firm, with approximately 33 percent of the storage space on the entire river, but ADM's share is 60 percent in the area above Pekin which will be the delivery area for the com futures contract. Cargill's acquisition will bring its share of capacity from 18 percent to 25 percent for the entire river, and increase its share of the Northern Illinois storage from 11 percent to 27 percent.^* Consolidated Grain and Barge is a large competitor in the lower Illinois River (28 percent of entire river storage), but only has one f^ility above Pekin. Cargill's acquisition might not appear problematic in this area if ADM was not so large. However, the combination of these two large players and their share of volume traded, not just storage capacity, in the futures market delivery area may prompt closer examination by the DOJ.
Several issues might warrant examination. First, is it appropriate to simply consider the barge loading firms as the competitors to examine, as a conduit to the export market as the special focus. Or must other firms buying grain for feed and processing from the same origination areas also be considered? If so, how many and how important are each in the local or regional market? This question is one we are unable to address in our briefstudy.
If the concern is about (1) whether competitive margins at an important export market conduit are likely to be effectively increased, or (2) whether the firms in the Northern Ulinois area approved for delivery by the CBOT may be able to artificially influence deliveries, handling costs, and therefore futures prices, basis, and price spreads, then a narrower drawing of the relevant market may be warranted. Otherwise, the competition from non-river locations will be an important factor diluting the estimated degree of concentration, perhaps dramatically.
Potential competition in the form of (1) excess capacity of current barge loading facilities, or (2) the speed and cost of adding new barge loading and/or storage capacity would also warrant study, to determine whether any potential market power of a few large firms could be quickly and easily defused by entry into these local or regional markets.
Chicago, Toledo and the Illinois River It might be argued that the consolidation in Chicago is merely a symptom of a dying market which has outlived its usefulness. One industry source contends that Chicago elevators are not a factor in the export trade as they are no longer in the main flow of grain; thus he was not concerned who owns or controls them as they do hot drive the market anymore.
Excess capacity present in Chicago and Toledo may be forcing consolidation. Further, broader competition for com, wheat and soybeans is present than is represented by the few ship or barge loading facilities in Chicago, Toledo and St. Louis which happen to be approved for CBOT deliveries. Perhaps this is no problem from a competition standpoint, but only a perceived problem because of the narrow definitions of delivery points by the CBOT (the expressed purpose for the narrower delivery^ea was to reduce basis variability). If so, that may be a problem to be solved by the CBOT, not the DOJ. The CBOT has made changes in contract delivery specifications effective beginning in the year 2000 by replacing deliveries via warehouse receipts in Chicago, Toledo and St. Louis with barge shipping certificates at approved locations on the Northern Illinois River (com) and Illinois River to St. Louis (soybeans). Proposals for changes in the CBOT wheat contract are pending. These changes are clear improvements to the contracts, by increasing the size of the delivery area and the number of facilities approved for delivery. One industry source characterizes the new delivery locations and specifications using shipping certificates as a very liquid market with very few barriers to entry. However, the near 85 percent share of storage capacity by two firms (and probably a higher share of volume) in the Northern Illinois River prompts a more thorough look at the situation there. Expanding the delivery areas to the entire Illinois River, adding the upper Mississippi as an option when it wasn't frozen, or similar changes to reduce concentration of ownership of barge loading facilities (or barges themselves, not considered here) may warrant consideration.
Potential competition
The grain coming to the Illinois River probably comes primarily from areas close to the Illinois or from points farther East, as the Mississippi is close to it on the West, and would intercept any grain from the West except when the Mississippi is closed to barge traffic in the winter. Thus, any artificial margin enhancement in the short run by the largest firms on the Illinois likely could be circumvented by, for example: going to uncooperative fringe competitors on the Illinois which currently have a lot of excess capacity (adding shifts or hours of operation); bypassing the Illinois to go to the Mississippi at a small marginal freight cost from areas East of the Mississippi (except in the winter); moving grain by truck or rail to lower Illinois River competitors, or using more expensive rail shipment to the Gulf -if other local processors, feed users, etc., did not provide effective competition. Such actions may be sufficient to keep the market well arbitraged and result in little or no margin enhancement. -At least one non-Cargill industry source contends the river market "is too "fluid" to allow squeezes to occur. It doesn't take much competition or delivery threat to make markets adjust to reality."
In the intermediate run, barge handling capacity could be added by adding truck-barge or rail-barge loading facilities at relatively low cost, or adding more expensive storage facilities with barge loading facilities at new locations. Industry sources suggest that a new truck-barge loader, with minimal storage capacity, could be up and running in about four months at an estimated cost of about $2-3 million, although required environmental assessments and permits might lengthen the period. A larger, more sophisticated facility with more extensive storage, two truck dumps and a drying system could be built in about eight months at a cost of about $5 million. Thus, entry of new competitors does not appear difficult if an adequate location can be found and environmental requirements accomodated. CBOT requirements of $5 million net worth also don't appear too restrictive for new entrants to qualify as delivery locations. With excess capacity now, and no clear signals that the export demand for grain will surge in the next year or two, there is no incentive for such expansion. If excess capacity remains, it would be difficult to exploit the high concentration on the Northern Illinois River, so new entrants may not be necessary to police the large companies for a long time.
Grain origination off-farms Table 20 summarizes the GIPSA-USDA data on off-farm storage capacities in the U.S.
by company (Mapped in Figure 2 , with Cargill and Continental Grain facilities noted). Ownership is not highly concentrated, with a large farmer cooperative influence. The acquisition will expand Cargill's geographic coverage in country locations as well as the river and port locations discussed above. Cargill reports that the two companies accounted for 10-13 percent of grain coming off farms last year (8-10 percent-Cargill, 1-2 percent-Continental Grain). This was from 3 percent of the 10,500 U.S. commercial grain storage facilities (with 6-7 percent of commercial storage space).
Summary and Overview
This quick study of the readily available data pertinent to evaluation of the Cargill acquisition of Continental Grain's grain merchandising business in the U.S. market offers the following insights:
• Concerns regarding loss of competition are prompted by the Cargill's acquisition of its largest competitor in the exporting of grain. Together, they account for roughly 35 percent of com, soybean and wheat volume, with a higher com export market share.
• The grain and oilseed markets are national in scope, for U.S. antitrust analysis, and international in scope as well.
• Most port locations are relatively concentrated with a relatively small number of owners, though the largest-volume locations like the Gulf have a large number of competitors. The "dying" Chicago grain elevator business declined from two competitors to one due to the acquisition. This could be a temporary problem due to its still being a CBOT delivery point in 1999, and another delivery pointToledo --is dominated by a Cargill/The Andersons joint venture. This still may be a problem for the CBOT wheat contract in 2000.
• Most river terminal locations were affected very little by the Cargill acquisition.
The Northern Illinois River, the new CBOT delivery location for com, now will have two firms accounting for over 85 percent of the barge loading elevator storage capacity after the acquisition. Excess capacity by smaller elevator competitors, other processor, feed company, etc., competitors in the market, and ease of entry might ease concerns about excess market power in this regional market. The CBOT may need to expand its com and wheat delivery areas to avoid perception of risk of manipulation by largest companies there.
• There are numerous competitors buying grain from farmers in most areas; the acquisition probably will make little difference in local competition for farmers' grain.
• The better utilization of excess capacity and likely cost reductions in the grain merchandising system are the primary efficiency gains which will have to be documented by Cargill in the antitrust review as offsets to any concerns regarding potential loss of competition.
Will potential efficiency gains and improved ability to serve the changing demands of farmers and customers make Cargill and the U.S. grain merchandising industry more effective competitors in the rapidly changing world market? Or will the further consolidation of the industry into fewer hands in important export and river terminal markets reduce competitiveness significantly in this very important marketing system? Some economists (Good, et al.) have argued that there are many competing uses and markets for grain in the U.S. and overseas to keep markets sufficiently arbitraged.
The dynamic changes in the world seed and grain production and marketing system which have been occurring and appear on the horizon (related to biotechnology) are likely to transform the system from the "commodity" orientation to a specialty (value-added trait) product system over the next decade ortwo. Is this acquisition likely to play a useful role in positioning this company and the U.S. industry as a more efficient and effective competitor for U.S. farmers' grain, and for customers in the U.S. and world markets? Or does it have some associated shortcomings for industry competitiveness in the short run which need to be remedied before the acquisition is approved by Perhaps the CBOT may need to shift their contract to the new delivery points in 1999, or negotiate a contract with Cargill and the Andersons which provides adequate safeguards on space availability, etc., for anyone making or taking delivery under CBOT futures contracts in Chicago and Toledo during the next year.
'If Continental Chicago and Cargill Bums Harbor facilities were included, the Cargill
Upper Illinois share would be 66 percent, ADM would be 28 percent. For the entire Illinois River, the Cargill share would increase to 46 percent, ADM would be 22 percent, while Consolidated Grain and Barge would be 20 percent. 
